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Abstract. In this paper a qualitative methodology for the
initial assessment of ﬂood-related Na-Tech risk was devel-
oped as a screening tool to identify which situations require
a much more expensive quantitative risk analysis (QRA).
Through the deﬁnition of some suitable key hazard indicators
(KHIs), the proposed methodology allows the identiﬁcation
of the Na-Tech risk level associated with a given situation;
the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) was used as a multi-
criteria decision tool for the evaluation of such qualitative
KHIs. The developed methodology was validated through
two case studies by comparing the predicted risk levels with
theresultsofmuchmoredetailedQRAspreviouslypresented
in literature and then applied to the real ﬂood happened at
Spolana a.s., Neratovice, Czech Republic in August 2002.
1 Introduction
Natural disasters may be powerful and prominent mecha-
nisms of direct or indirect release of hazardous material
(Young et al., 2004). If industrial sites are located in naturally
hazard-prone areas, technological accidents may be triggered
by natural events, which could generate the so-called Na-
Tech (Natural and Technological) events and may modify as
well as increase the impact and overall damage in surround-
ing areas (Galderisi et al., 2008).
In recent years Na-Tech events have received a signiﬁ-
cant attention and many reviews on Na-Tech events spanning
over 30yr have been published (Chang and Lin, 2006; Cruz
et al., 2006; Rasmussen, 1995; Showalter and Myers, 1994;
Krausmann et al., 2011); nevertheless, there is little infor-
mation available on the interactions between natural disas-
ters and simultaneous technological accidents. In addition,
natural disasters have increased both in frequency and eco-
nomic losses around the world (Young et al., 2004); there-
fore, there is increasing public awareness and interest from
the scientiﬁc community (Renni et al., 2010). Recent exam-
ples of Na-Tech events are reported in the literature (Cozzani
et al., 2010; Cruz and Krausmann, 2009; Cruz and Okada,
2008; Picou, 2009), but only a few papers discuss approaches
and methodologies necessary to face the problems they cause
(Cozzani et al., 2006; Cruz and Okada, 2008; Fendler, 2008;
Galderisi et al., 2008; Krausmann and Mushtaq, 2008).
The most powerful tool to evaluate the impact that a nat-
ural event may have on industrial facilities is an extension
of the classical quantitative risk analysis (QRA) to situations
where an industrial accident is triggered by a natural event
(Antonioni et al., 2007, 2009; Campedel et al., 2008b; Fab-
brocino et al., 2005). A limitation of the QRA is that it re-
quires large amounts of resources in terms of both time and
expertise; thus, a shortcut methodology for the assessment of
industrial risks induced by natural events, which should be
easy to handle and capable of taking into account the most
important phenomena that occur in a Na-Tech event, should
be useful at least for screening purposes (i.e. for deciding
when it is worthwhile to conduct a QRA). In this work, a
simple methodology for assessing qualitatively ﬂood-related
Na-Tech risk was developed and validated by comparison
with available results from more detailed QRAs.
2 Methodology
A shortcut procedure should be easy to apply, require a
small amount of resources and information and summarize,
through suitable qualitative key hazard indicators (KHIs), the
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Na-Tech risk level associated with a given situation (i.e. a
process plant located at a given position).
Unfortunately, estimating the values of such KHIs requires
a simultaneous comparisons among a large number of dif-
ferent parameters, ranging from the types of hazardous sub-
stances present in the plant to the intensity of the external
natural force, which are incommensurable, i.e. not directly
comparable due to different units of measure and physical
meaning (Bell and Glade, 2004).
This requires the use of a multi-criteria decision method
to account for the different and often incommensurable ef-
fects (heat radiation due to a ﬁre, pressure waves due to an
explosion, toxicity due to a dispersion of a toxic compound
and so on) of various parameters. Among the various ap-
proaches available, the analytical hierarchy process (AHP)
(Saaty, 2000) is a method that can support decision mak-
ing by establishing alternatives within a framework of multi-
weighted criteria. This method allows for choosing among
various alternatives through binary comparison, that is, con-
sidering only two elements at a time. The idea of using the
AHP in the context of Na-Tech risk analysis has been re-
cently proposed (Rota et al., 2008), and a practical shortcut
procedure for earthquake-related Na-Tech events has been
developed (Busini et al., 2011). As for the earthquake-related
Na-Tech events, the use of the AHP requires the identiﬁca-
tion of all the main elements that can inﬂuence the vulnera-
bility of the plant with respect to ﬂoods; such elements, while
covering all the relevant aspects, should be few and easy to
evaluate.
All the details of using the AHP for developing a shortcut
methodology for assessing Na-Tech risk are not reported in
the present paper, since they are extensively discussed else-
where (Busini et al., 2011); here it sufﬁces to mention that
binary comparisons between elements must be established,
and they must be arranged in suitable hierarchies structured
with the goal on top (in this case the KHI), with different
branches. At the bottom of the hierarchy there are the alter-
natives, which characterize the given plant with respect to
the Na-Tech effect on people. In Na-Tech accidents, the main
consequences are broadly due to three phenomena: ﬁres, ex-
plosions, and toxic dispersions. Therefore, three different hi-
erarchiesmustbedevelopedforNa-Techaccidentsleadingto
three distinct KHIs: KHIF, KHIT, and KHIE, for ﬁres, toxic
dispersion, and explosion, respectively.
Through simple mathematical manipulations (Saaty,
2000), from the normalized values assigned to the alterna-
tives, it is possible to compute the three KHIs values on a
0–1 scale. To determine the overall risk level of a given plant
characterized by the three values of KHIF, KHIT, and KHIE,
these values can be condensed into a global KHI (KHIG),
which represents the overall risk level in the KHIs space. Be-
cause the origin of the 3-D KHIs space represents the op-
timal condition, i.e. the lower the KHI value the lower the
related risk level, a point into the KHIs space, identiﬁed by
the three values KHIF, KHIT, and KHIE, represents a risk
level related to its distance from the origin. Therefore, KHIG
can be evaluated through a norm providing the distance from
the origin, which in a 3-D space can be simply obtained as
the square root of the sum of the three squared KHIs (Busini
et al., 2011):
The value of the KHIG can be related to different risk lev-
els, reasonably indicating a low sensitivity to the Na-Tech
events of the analyzed plant for KHIG < 10−2, medium for
10−2 <KHIG < 10−1 and high for KHIG > 10−1.
High rated plants require further analysis through a dedi-
cated QRA, while low rated plants do not. The Na-Tech risk
related to medium rated plants is neither negligible nor un-
acceptable; this is a sort of ALARP (As Low As Reasonably
Practicable) region (Lees, 1996), where the decision is deter-
mined by the analyst and must be decided on a case-by-case
basis.
3 Hierarchies
3.1 Hierarchy for ﬁres (KHIF)
The KHIF is related to the impact area of ﬁres (e.g. ﬁreball,
ﬂash ﬁre, or pool ﬁre) arising from a Na-Tech event.
Along the same lines discussed elsewhere (Busini et al.,
2011), it can be assumed that the elements that primarily
inﬂuence the impact area are the speciﬁc thermal power
of the stored material and the speciﬁc ﬂow of combustible
vapors arising from the released materials. This leads to
the hierarchy summarized in Fig. 1, which is composed by
the fundamental objective (KHIF), two levels related to the
two main elements identiﬁed (in terms of combustion en-
thalpy and volatility), and the alternatives representing the
plant/territory characteristics. A given plant located in a spe-
ciﬁc environment subject to ﬂooding risk is characterized by
the ensemble of the basic alternatives. Each “alternative” is
characterized by an overall normalized index, Mhb (where h
indicates the hierarchy F, T or E, while b indicates a branch
of a hierarchy) of the amount of a given class of substances
which is expected to be released in case of a ﬂood event with
a given intensity. Clearly, a branch may not be utilized (the
branch has zero weight in calculating the index), depending
on the characteristics of the materials present in the con-
sidered plant. Analogously, one or two of the three hierar-
chies may be not used (e.g. in the case of toxic substances
that are neither ﬂammable nor explosive). On the other hand,
a volatile ﬂammable material characterized by toxic vapors
will be the input of both the hierarchy for ﬁres and the hier-
archy for toxic dispersion.
The relative importance among the different branches of
the same hierarchy were deﬁned on the basis of technical
rules of thumb as discussed elsewhere (Busini et al., 2011).
Since the deﬁnition of the alternatives, which characterize a
given plant in a speciﬁc environment, is common to the three
hierarchies it will be discussed later.
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Fig. 1. Hierarchy used for ﬂood-related Na-Tech qualitative risk analysis in case of ﬁres. The weights assigned are shown along the different
branches, while the related question to be answered is located above each level.
3.2 Hierarchy for toxic dispersion (KHIT)
KHIT is related to the impact area of a Na-Tech event related
to the release of toxic materials that can disperse into the
atmosphere.
In this case, the principal elements are the toxicity (sum-
marized in the IDLH value) and the volatility of the released
material. This leads to the hierarchy summarized in Fig. 2,
which is constituted by the fundamental objective (KHIT),
two levels related to the two main elements identiﬁed (toxic-
ity and volatility), and the alternatives.
Also in this case, full details concerning the criteria and
the technical considerations about the choice of the weights
are reported elsewhere (Busini et al., 2011).
3.3 Hierarchy of explosions (KHIE)
KHIE is related to the impact area of a Na-Tech event leading
to an explosion; the principal elements correspond to the type
of energy released (mechanical or chemical), the speciﬁc en-
ergy (in terms of pressure or combustion enthalpies), and the
volatility (for vapor cloud explosion, VCE), as summarized
in Fig. 3.
Criteria and technical considerations about the choice of
the weights are discussed elsewhere (Busini et al., 2011).
4 Evaluation of the alternatives: characteristics of the
plant/ﬂood
For each branch a normalized index of the mass of simi-
lar materials (i.e. capable of generating similar scenarios in
terms of effects), which can be released following a ﬂood
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Fig. 2. Hierarchy used for the ﬂood-related Na-Tech qualitative risk analysis in case of a toxic dispersion. The weights assigned are shown
along the different branches, while the related question to be answered is located above each level.
event having a certain intensity, should be provided. The pro-
cedure for the calculation of the normalized indexes Mhb (h
corresponds to one of the three hierarchies T, F, or E while b
corresponds to one of the branches of the hierarchy) is sum-
marized in the block diagram of Fig. 4.
In literature there are no simple and general methods or
parameters to evaluate and quantify the severity of ﬂoods,
which are usually scheduled through their return period, usu-
ally between 10 and 500yr. The return period (TR) denotes
the interval between two events of the same intensity and
then indirectly expresses the probability that a ﬂood will oc-
cur. Concerning the land use planning, usually ﬂuvial regions
(theso-called“ﬂuvialstrips”),whichdelimittheriverbedand
identify ﬂoodplains, are deﬁned (Autorit` a di bacino del ﬁume
Po, 1999). The delimitation of areas of potential ﬂooding in
the event of failure of the banks is done through analysis
of historical routes, morphological characteristics of the sur-
rounding area and the hydraulic quantities involved (Autorit` a
di bacino del ﬁume Po, 1999).
For instance, in Italian maps, areas of ﬂooding as a func-
tion of the return time are identiﬁed through return period
values (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 29 settembre
1998 (G.U. 5 gennaio 1999 n.3)).
In particular three “ﬂuvial strips” are identiﬁed: a “ﬂuvial
strip A” corresponding to the active river basin, an interme-
diate zone that includes the ﬁrst and extends up to the banks
(“ﬂuvial strip B” with return period of 200yr), and a third
strip of extraordinary ﬂooding that also includes the ﬁrst two
(“ﬂuvial strip C” with a return period of 500yr). The term
active river basin is used to deﬁne that part of the territory
affected by the ﬂow of water or by the ordinary ﬂood, and
includes areas that belong morphologically to the river, sep-
arated from the edge of the bank or from the inner natural
levee.
Criteria different from the aforementioned one can be used
for deﬁning the “ﬂuvial strips” with respect to different val-
ues of the return period; however, we assume that at least
a three level classiﬁcation (“strip A”, high probability of
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Fig. 3. Hierarchy used for ﬂood-related Na-Tech qualitative risk analysis in case of an explosion. The weights assigned are shown along the
different branches, while the related question to be answered is located above each level.
ﬂooding; “strip B”, medium probability and “strip C”, low
probability) is available with the corresponding return peri-
ods.
The ﬁrst step in the procedure summarized in Fig. 4 is to
identify the “ﬂuvial strip” where the plant is located. Once
the reference “ﬂuvial strip” is known, the magnitude of the
expected ﬂood event in terms of height and velocity of the
water has to be estimated; since data concerning expected
water depth and water velocity, which of course would be the
optimum, are not always available, a simpliﬁed procedure to
estimate them was developed. It assumes that
– The maximum water depth (1Z) may be estimated as
the difference between the quote of the boundary of the
“ﬂuvial strip” (ZPAI), where the plant is located, and the
lowest elevation in the site of interest (Zi), that is, the
lowest point of the plant. When the plant is located on
a higher quote than the limit of the ﬂuvial strip, a 1Z
value equal to zero is assumed.
– The mean velocity of a gravity-driven ﬂow in rough
open channels and rivers can be estimated using the
Manning’s formula (Le M´ ehaut´ e, 1976), which embod-
ies a large amount of experimental results and can be
written as
v =
1
m
s1/3R2/3 (1)
where v (ms−1) is the mean velocity of the ﬂow, s
(mm−1) is the slope of the channel, R (m) is the
hydraulic radius of the cross section of the channel (de-
ﬁned as the area of the cross section of the channel, A,
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Fig. 4. Procedure for the evaluation of alternatives in the hierarchy.
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Fig. 5. Graphic representation for the estimation of the (a) slope of
the channel (s), (b) cross section of the channel (A) and (c) wetted
perimeter (p).
divided by the length of the wetted perimeter, p, which
can be easily computed assuming a simpliﬁed rectan-
gular or trapezoidal shape of the channel), and n is a
roughness coefﬁcient related, through standard values,
to the river characteristics (Le M´ ehaut´ e, 1976).
With reference to Fig. 5, the slope of the channel, the
cross section of the channel and the wetted perimeter
can be deﬁned as follow:
– the slope of the channel can be estimated as the quote
difference between the upstream side and downstream
side of the plant, q, divided by the length of the plant in
the direction of the river ﬂow, L:
s =
q
L
(2)
– the cross section of the channel is deﬁned as a rectan-
gular and vertical area transverse to the river passing
through the site of interest along the shortest distance
between the plant and the river bed. The ﬂow section
has as its basis, b, the points that limit along that line
the ﬂuvial strip to which the plant belongs and as height,
h, the quote difference between the limits of the ﬂuvial
strip and the surface of the river:
A = b×h (3)
Fig. 6. Estimation of equipment damage probability with respect to
maximum water height and velocity.
– The wetted perimeter, p, is the perimeter of the ﬂow
section and is calculated as
p = 2b+2h. (4)
Once the magnitude of the event has been determined in
terms of maximum water depth and water velocity, the dam-
ageprobabilityoftheequipmentpresentintheplanthastobe
evaluated. The quality of the data reported in industrial acci-
dent databases for equipment damage due to ﬂoods is usually
not homogeneous; in particular, the information about the
type of ﬂood and the water impact modes is frequently not
available (Cozzani et al., 2010; Fendler, 2008; Krausmann
and Mushtaq, 2008). With respect to the structural damage
of process equipment caused by the ﬂood, in most cases the
reference to equipment damage is only expressed in general
terms, without specifying which damage modes are leading
to loss of containment (LOC) (Cozzani et al., 2010; Fendler,
2008; Krausmann and Mushtaq, 2008). Consequently, it is
difﬁcult to understand the dynamics of the accidents and to
assess the extent of the damage suffered by the equipment.
As a ﬁrst approximation, equipment vulnerability may be es-
timated using the data provided in Fig. 6, which reports in
a simple and effective way the equipment damage probabil-
ity as a function of water height and water velocity (Anto-
nioni et al., 2009). Along the same line discussed elsewhere
for earthquake-related Na-Tech events (Busini et al., 2011),
since historical analytical methods reveal that storage tanks
are the most likely to produce dramatic accidental scenarios
in the case of industrial accidents triggered by natural events,
reactors, pumps, pipes, and other items are overlooked.
Once the damage probability for the tank i (DPi) present
in the plant is estimated, the factor of increment of the risk
(fIR) can be calculated multiplying the damage probability
for tank i with the ratio between the TR, for the “ﬂuvial strip”
C, e.g. equal to 500yr, and the TRi of the “ﬂuvial strip” in
which the plant is located.
fIRi = DPi ×
500
RRi
(5)
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This accounts for the different probability of ﬂoods in
different “ﬂuvial strips”, leading for “ﬂuvial strip” C to a
fIR = DPi.
Obviously, if a plant is located in “ﬂuvial strip” A (which
is characterized by the highest probability), it is subject to
all the ﬂoods that can take place in that area, from those that
involve “ﬂuvial strip” A to those that involve “ﬂuvial strip”
C. Consequently, a recursive block is inserted into the ﬂow
diagram of Fig. 4 to account for this; however, among the
different values of fIR that can be obtained, the largest one
is used for the following calculations, therefore leading to
conservative results: fIR = max(fIRi)|i=A,B,C.
Only tanks containing liquids with density lower than wa-
ter are considered since ignition, atmospheric gas dispersion
or explosion of subwater liquids is extremely unlikely. Note
that, even though in several ﬂood related Na-Tech events, en-
vironmental pollution was one of the main consequences; it
was not considered in the present paper because of the neces-
sity to validate the method with available QRAs that do not
take this issue into account.
The material contained in the various tanks of the plant
has to be classiﬁed according to its hazardous properties.
This can be done according to the European Chemicals Bu-
reau (The Council of the EEC, 1967), which has classiﬁed
substances in various classes depending on their properties.
Toxic substances, classiﬁed as T +, T, C, Xi, Xn, N, will
feed the KHIT hierarchy, ﬂammable substances classiﬁed as
F + or F will feed the KHIF and KHIE hierarchy, while pres-
surized gaseous substances and explosive substances will fed
the KHIE hierarchy.
In case of ﬂooding, it is also important to take into account
those types of substances that in normal condition do not lead
to risk for human safety and health but can become danger-
ous in contact with water. Thus the block “Substance con-
tained in tank j reacts with water?” is inserted into the logi-
cal procedure of Fig. 4. It follows that if the substance reacts
with water, the kind and quantities of dangerous byproducts
must be estimated assuming that all the chemicals stored in
the tank will lead to the stoichiometric amounts of the haz-
ardous byproducts, which will be treated as they were sub-
stances contained in the plant.
For each tank j containing a dangerous material or a mate-
rial which can react dangerously with water, a reference mass
expected to be released in case of ﬂood (Mhbj) can be com-
puted from its overall factor of increment of the risk (fIR)
and a relative mass M%j as
Mhbj = M%j ×fIR. (6)
The relative mass percentage contained in tank j is com-
puted as the percentage with respect to the threshold value
deﬁned by the Seveso II European Directive (The Council of
the EU, 1996). If the directive does not indicate a threshold
for the material in the tank, it will not be considered in the
analysis.
Table 1. Data used to characterize the magnitude of the natural
event and the resulting damage probability (DP) and factor of in-
crement of the risk (fIR) for the case study considered.
“ﬂuvial strip” C
Return Time 500 (years)
ZPAI 10 (m)
Zi 9 (m)
1Z 1 (m)
p 2504 (m)
A 2500 (m2)
n 0.035
s 0.0091
v 2.721 (ms−1)
DP 100%
fIR 1
The subscript hbj indicates which hierarchy (h =T, F, E)
and which branch (b = 1,...,Nbh) of the hierarchy has to be
utilized for tank j on the basis of the substance classiﬁcation.
More than one hbj can be deﬁned for each tank depending on
the substances stored.
Onceareferencemassiscomputedforallthetankspresent
in the plant, the alternative values for all the hierarchies and
branches (Mhb) can be computed as follows:
Mhb =
XNT
j=1Mhbj h = T, F, E b = 1,...,Nbh (7)
where Nbh is the number of branches in the h-th hierarchy.
Recalling that the AHP would require to normalize the
scores assigned to the alternatives to the maximum value that
they can assume in order to obtain a value ranging between
0–1; it may happen that Mhb will be higher than 1; in this
case it will be necessary to limit that value to 1.
5 Validation of the methodology
The study cases used for validating the proposed simpliﬁed
methodologyreferstoindustrialplantsforwhichresultsfrom
a detailed QRA considering also Na-Tech events are avail-
able in the literature (Campedel et al., 2008a; Antonioni et
al., 2009). This allows a comparison between the results of
the proposed simpliﬁed methodology and the results of a
much more detailed QRA.
Finally, a third case study was performed applying the
methodology on a well-known real case: ﬂood at Spolana
a.s., Neratovice, Czech Republic in August 2002.
5.1 Case study 1
The plant layout sketched in Fig. 7 shows the position, num-
ber, and catch basins of the units considered in the analysis.
According to design standards, each unit is identiﬁed by an
identiﬁcation code (e.g. PV A1, PV B1, etc.).
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Fig. 7. Layout of the plant considered in case study 1.
The data required to characterize the magnitude of the nat-
ural event are summarized in Table 1. From these data the
damage probability of the equipment and the relative fre-
quency of damage can be easily estimated and are also re-
ported in Table 1.
Considering that in the plant only anhydrous ammonia is
present, whose limits are not explicitly deﬁned in the Seveso
II Directive, it was considered as a toxic material and Table 2
reports the percentage in respect to the limit of the Directive
(M%) and the index of weighted mass (Mhbj) calculated for
each tank. The alternative value Mhb can be easily computed
from these data and it is also reported in Table 2.
Although anhydrous ammonia reacts with water, the reac-
tion products have similar chemical properties as ammonia,
therefore, leading to similar hazards.
Feeding the various hierarchies with this values, the val-
ues of the KHIs can be easily computed through algebraic
manipulations (Saaty, 2000) and they are summarized in Ta-
ble 3.
The index for ﬁres (KHIF) results from the fact that the
substance has low enthalpy of combustion and it is stored as
compressed/liqueﬁed gas; the KHIT results from the combi-
nation of the weight of a substance with low toxicity stored
as compressed/liqueﬁed gas; the KHIE is determined by the
sum of the contribution of a VCE for a substance with low
enthalpy of combustion stored as compressed/liqueﬁed gas
and a physical expansion in condition of low internal pres-
sure.
To validate the methodology, the overall risk index derived
from the qualitative analysis (KHIG = 6.1×10−2, meaning
“medium” risk) was compared with the numerical values ob-
tained from the QRA. In particular the potential life loss
(PLL) Index, which indicates the number of expected deaths
in a year in a certain portion of land surrounding the plant,
caused by a certain accidental event, it is deﬁned as
Fig. 8. Layout of the plant considered in case study 2.
PLL =
∞ Z
0
F ×dN (8)
where F is the cumulative frequency of accidents and N
is the expected number of fatalities (Antonioni et al., 2009,
2007; Campedel et al., 2008b; Lees, 1996).
The PLL index values obtained from the QRA are sum-
marized in Table 3: the ﬁrst one does not consider the ﬂood
eventasinitiatoreventfortheindustrialaccident(PLLinternal)
and the second one considers the ﬂood as the initiator event
(PLLﬂood) (Campedel et al., 2008a), from which the incre-
ment of the risk due to the presence of the natural phe-
nomenon can be estimated as
PLLratio =
PLLﬂood
PLLinternal
. (9)
The rank obtained with the proposed shortcut method is in
good agreement with the results obtained from the QRA: as
discussed elsewhere for earthquake-related Na-Tech events
(Busini et al., 2011), the presence of the ﬂood-related Na-
Tech event entails an increment of one order of magnitude
of the PLL value, and accordingly the proposed simpliﬁed
method provides a medium ranking.
5.2 Case study 2
The plant layout sketched in Fig. 8 show the position, num-
ber, and catch basins of the units considered in the analysis.
According to design standards, each unit is identiﬁed by an
identiﬁcation code.
On the basis of available data for the site (a ﬂat zone in
the north of Italy), the reference ﬂood event was assumed to
have a maximum water height of 1m and a negligible ﬂow
velocity. The expected return time of the ﬂood was consid-
ered to be of 1000yr. The data required to characterize the
magnitude of the natural event in order to apply the presented
shortcut methodology were taken from a more detailed QRA
(Campedel et al., 2008a) and are summarized in Table 4.
From these data the damage probability of the equipment and
the relative frequency of damage can be easily estimated and
are also reported in Table 4.
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Table 2. Quantity of substance stored and corresponding index of weighted mass, used in the case-study.
Tank Quantity stored (103 kg) M%j Mhbj
PV-A1 16.8 0.084 M%j ×fIR = 0.084
PV-A2 16.8 0.084 M%j ×fIR = 0.084
PV-B 2.8 0.014 M%j ×fIR = 0.014
PV-C 5.6 0.028 M%j ×fIR = 0.028
Total index of weighted mass Mhb =
P4
j=1Mhbj 0.21
Table 3. Risk indexes obtained from QRA (PLLs [28]) and from the presented methodology (KHIs) for case study 1.
PLLinternal PLLﬂood PLLratio KHIF KHIT KHIE KHIG Risk level
(fatalities/year) (fatalities/year)
7.7×10−5 3.5×10−3 4.7×101 2.6×10−2 2.3×10−2 5.0×10−2 6.1×10−2 Medium
Table 4. Data used to characterize the magnitude of the natural
event and the resulting damage probability (DP) and factor of in-
crement of the risk (fIR) for the case study considered.
“ﬂuvial strip” C
Return Time 1000 (years)
1Z 1 (m)
v 0 (ms−1)
DP 55%
fIR 0.275
In the plant only anhydrous ammonia is present: Table 5
reports the percentage respect to the limit of the Seveso II
Directive (M%) and the index of weighted mass (Mhbj) cal-
culated for each tank. The alternative value Mhb can be easily
computed from these data and it is also reported in Table 5.
As in the case study 1, for the ammonia the limits of the tox-
ics were considered and the reaction products were neglected
having chemical properties similar to the ammonia.
Feeding the various hierarchies with these values, the val-
ues of the KHIs can be easily computed through algebraic
manipulations (Saaty, 2000); their values are summarized in
Table 6.
The parameters that contribute to deﬁne the indexes results
from the fact that the substance has low enthalpy of combus-
tion and it is stored as compressed/liqueﬁed gas (KHIF), is
considered to have a low level of toxicity (KHIT), and it may
give rise to a VCE and to a physical expansion in condition
of low internal pressure (KHIE).
To validate the methodology, the overall risk index derived
from the qualitative analysis (KHIG = 2.5×10−2, meaning
“medium” risk) is compared with the numerical values ob-
tained from the QRA (Campedel et al., 2008a).
The PLL index values obtained from the QRA are sum-
marized in Table 6: the ﬁrst one does not considers the ﬂood
eventasinitiatoreventfortheindustrialaccident(PLLinternal)
Table 5. Quantity of substance stored and corresponding index of
weighted mass used in the case-study.
Tank Quantity stored M%j Mhbj
(103 kg)
PV-A1 15.14 0.076 0.021
PV-A2 15.14 0.076 0.021
PV-B1 11 0.055 0.015
PV-B2 11 0.055 0.015
PV-B3 11 0.055 0.015
Total index of weighted mass Mhb 0.087
and the second one considers the ﬂood as the initiator event
(PLLﬂood) (Campedel et al., 2008a; Antonioni et al., 2009).
The rank obtained with the proposed shortcut method is in
good agreement with the results obtained from the QRA: as
discussed elsewhere for earthquake-related Na-Tech events
(Busini et al., 2011), the presence of the ﬂood-related Na-
Tech event entails an increment of one order of magnitude
of the PLL value, and accordingly the proposed simpliﬁed
method provides a medium ranking.
5.3 Case study 3: ﬂood at Spolana a.s., Neratovice,
Czech Republic in August 2002
Spolana is a Czech chemical plant in Neratovice established
in 1898. The chemical plant is situated approximately 25km
north of Prague at the conﬂuence of the Koˇ s´ ateck´ y brook and
the river Elbe. In 2002 the river Elbe overﬂowed and ﬂooded
the Spolana chemical plant, causing a release of chlorine
of about 400kg. It was a catastrophic ﬂood with water ex-
ceeding the “hundred year water level” by 1.3m (Hudec and
Luks, 2004).
The Spolana site consists of more than 700 separate
premises(350ofwhicharebuildings);atthetimeoftheﬂood
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Table 6. Risk indexes obtained from QRA (PLLs [28]) and from the presented methodology (KHIs) for case study 1.
PLLinternal PLLﬂood PLLratio KHIF KHIT KHIE KHIG Risk level
(fatalities/year) (fatalities/year)
8.0×10−4 1.9×10−2 2.5×10 1.1×10−2 1.0×10−2 2.1×10−2 2.5×10−2 Medium
Table 7. List of tanks divided by storehouse (a, b, c), quantity
of substance stored for each tank, and corresponding index of
weighted mass used in the case-study 3.
Quanity stored M% Mhbj
(103 kg)
PV A1 (full 80%) 102.4 409.6 409.6
PV A2 (3%) 3.84 15.36 15.36
PV A3 (3%) 3.84 15.36 15.36
PV A4 (3%) 3.84 15.36 15.36
PV A5 (3%) 3.84 15.36 15.36
PV A6 (20%) 25.6 102.4 102.4
PV A7 (20%) 25.6 102.4 102.4
PV A8 (20%) 25.6 102.4 102.4
PV A9 (20%) 25.6 102.4 102.4
PV A10 (20%) 25.6 102.4 102.4
PV B1 (full 80%) 20.48 81.92 81.92
Total index of weighted mass (limited to 1) Mhb 1
Spolana had approximately 2500 employees including shift-
workers.
Liqueﬁed chlorine was stored in chlorine tanks located in
two storehouses, whose internal arrangement was practically
identical. There were ﬁve tanks of 80m3 located in each
building plus another smaller tank (blow-case) of 16m3 situ-
ated in the old storehouse (Hudec and Luks, 2004). The tanks
in the chlorine storehouses contained different amounts of
chlorine: some contained only gaseous chlorine as a residue
after discharging, some were ﬁlled up to 20%, and one tank
was practically full (Hudec and Luks, 2004). Since precise
information about how many tanks were ﬁlled and in which
way are unknown, in our calculation we will assume, for con-
servative reasons, that only 4 tanks were ﬁlled at 3% (those
that contained only gaseous chlorine as a residue after dis-
charging); 5 tanks were ﬁlled at 20% and the one full was
ﬁlled at 80% (full). Moreover, the 16m3 blow-case tank was
assumed to be full for conservative reasons (80%) leading
to chlorine quantities much larger than those deﬁned in Arti-
cle 8 of Seveso II Directive.
From the ﬂood record it can be deduced that the ﬂood in its
critical stage (at 15:00 on the day 15 August 2002) reached
164.5m a.s.l. (Hudec and Luks, 2004). Considering that the
lowest point of the plant is sited about 162m a.s.l. we can
consider a maximum water level of about 2.5m. Moreover,
on the basis of available data for the site (Hudec and Luks,
2004), the reference ﬂood event was assumed to have a neg-
ligible ﬂow velocity and the expected return time of the ﬂood
Table 8. Risk indexes obtained from the presented methodology
(KHIs) for case study 3.
KHIF KHIT KHIE KHIG Risk level
0.00 4.44×10−1 2.18×10−1 4.95×10−1 HIGH
was assumed equal to 500yr, since the expected one-hundred
years ﬂood was broadly exceeded (1.3m) (Hudec and Luks,
2004); this choice is not determinant because the graph in
Fig. 6 shows that for water levels higher than 1.4m the dam-
age probability is 100%, regardless water ﬂow velocity.
Considering that in the plant only liqueﬁed chlorine is
present, Table 7 reports the percentage respect to the limit
of the Seveso II Directive (M%) and the index of weighted
mass (Mhbj) calculated for each tank. The alternative value
Mhb can be easily computed from these data and it is also
reported in Table 7.
Feeding the various hierarchies with Mhb value, the val-
ues of the KHIs can be easily computed through algebraic
manipulations (Saaty, 2000); their values are summarized in
Table 8. The parameters that contribute to deﬁne the indexes
arise from the liqueﬁed chlorine properties: not ﬂammable
(KHIF = 0), stored at low pressure (KHIE > 0) and highly
toxic (KHIT > 0).
The high risk to ﬂood-related Na-tech events predicted by
the methodology is in good agreement whit the large conse-
quences observed. In fact, after being ﬂooded, the empty and
less loaded tanks were lifted by buoyancy forces according
to Archimedes’ law and displaced from their normal posi-
tions. The buoyancy forces were so strong that their action
deformed and lifted the walkways situated above the tanks.
The closing valves in the full tank got caught by the walkway
and were completely torn off as the walkway kept moving
upwards. As a consequence of the valves being torn off from
the full tank, a massive leakage of chlorine occurred (Hudec
and Luks, 2004). The impact of the ﬂood at the chemical fac-
tory resulted not only in a contamination of the River Elbe
but also in a chlorine cloud which forced residents to seek
safety indoors.
6 Conclusions
Since ﬂoods may be powerful and prominent mechanisms
of direct and indirect hazmat releases, ﬂood related Na-Tech
events might increase the impact and the overall damage in
surrounding areas of industrial sites.
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The aim of this study was to provide a referential shortcut
methodology for the assessment of industrial risks induced
by ﬂoods through suitable qualitative KHIs computed using
the analytical hierarchy process.
The methodology developed requires few resources and
little information on both the plant and the expected ﬂood.
Therefore, it would be suitable at any stage of a plant’s life
(i.e. from the early design stage to an already existing plant).
The developed methodology was validated by a com-
parison with independent results obtained by QRA reports
(Campedel et al., 2008a; Antonioni et al., 2009) in terms
of the ratio between PLL values in presence and absence of
the ﬂood event, showing a good agreement. Moreover, it was
also applied on a well-known real case: ﬂood at Spolana a.s.,
Neratovice, Czech Republic in August 2002 leading to re-
sults in good agreement with the recorded damages.
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